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Abstract 
Military applications of technologies for enhancing or producing vision play a key role in 
composing contemporary security, as such technologies are deployed to make security 
sense of everyday sociality, of battlefields, and of much in between these extremes. In 
this paper, I set out to recompose militarized techno-vision through the public detritus 
left by its heterogenous development, use, and appropriation. I argue that as an 
heterogenous and amalgamated object, military techno-vision can be composed by 
speaking the stories of its leftovers, and that this composition is characterised by and in 
turn characterises a longstanding dilemma between fact and vision – between the 
ambiguity that is constitutive of the human practices of visual perception and image-
making, and the desire for machines that can produce visual ‘actionable intelligence’ that 
can underpin security decisions. Discourses, practices and regimes of visibility are 
deployed alongside technologies to occlude the ambiguity of technological vision and 
sustain the imaginary of technologically altered vision as neutral production of military or 
security facts.  
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Composing military techno-vision 
What would the technologies employed for military ‘enhanced’ vision tell us if we could 
assemble them and question them about the work they are being asked to do for us? 
That is the question that I had long been interested in, it dawned upon me when reading 
Vinciane Despret’s fabulous animal stories of science-making peacocks and semiotic 
tics.1 Like these animals, visual technologies participate in making sense of the world, 
1 V. Despret, What would animals say if we asked the right questions?, (University of Minnesota Press, 2016). 
This is the accepted manuscript of the article, which has been published in European Journal of 
International Security. 2019, 4(3), 300-321. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2019.17
including for the purposes of war and security, and participate in making (lethal) 
decisions and classifications, but – again like the animals used in scientific studies that 
populate Despret’s work – they are rarely regarded as other than instruments of 
domination and fields of competition, rarely allowed to participate in speaking about the 
domains of politics, science and technology they are part of making. Here, I hope, they 
are.2  
 
To some theorists of media interested in military matters such as Kittler, Virilio and their 
many followers, the relationship between conflict and visual media technologies is close 
to inevitable, expressed and even appearing to be determined in c, the constant 
denominating the speed of light and the highest speed with which to make information 
travel. With this idea comes the idea that vision is not just another sense/interface – 
which could have been replaced by smell or hearing in differently configured 
technologies, but that optical media present unique opportunities for speed, and it 
becomes unsurprising from this perspective that in the military domain, forms of 
technological vision and visual technology have for long played crucial roles in the 
assemblages that compose and manage global politics3. From less techno-centric or –
deterministic points of view, ethical desires to ground security decisions in facts or 
regimes of precision and traceability4 can lead towards similar appreciations for 
technological forms of vision that leverage the epistemic authority of images5, yet in both 
the goal that technologies are employed to serve easily becomes privileged vis-à-vis the 
specific technologies serving them. By telling the stories of detritus left from the 
development and use of military techno-vision, I assert that, when told together, the 
                                               
2 With the usual caveats regarding the final product, I wish to thank the special issue editors, journal editor, 
anonymous reviewers, insightful participants at the Compositions workshop in San Francisco, and at the 
TASER seminar in Tampere in 2018, Mareile Kaufmann and other encouraging critic peers at 
NordSTEVA 2017, as well as perceptive audience and fellow panellists at the 2018 EISA and 2019 ISA 
panels where this work was presented.  
3 J. Der Derian, Virtuous war: mapping the military-industrial-media-entertainment network, 2nd ed. ed. (Routledge, 
2009); R. Bishop and J. Phillips, Modernist avant-garde aesthetics and contemporary military technology: technicities of 
perception, (Edinburgh University Press, 2010); R. Stahl, Through the crosshairs: war, visual culture, and the 
weaponized gaze, (Rutgers University Press, 2018). 
4 as discussed in J. P. Burgess, The ethical subject of security: geopolitical reason and the threat against Europe, 
(Routledge, 2011); M. Zehfuss, ‘Targeting: Precision and the production of ethics’, European Journal of 
International Relations, 17/3 (2011), 543–66. 
5 for a discussion of visual epistemic authority in relation to security, see R. Saugmann Andersen, 
‘Epistemic Authority, Lies, and Video: the Constitution of Knowledge and (in)Security in the 
Video/Security Nexus’, JOMEC Journal, 2013/4 (2013); R. Saugmann Andersen, ‘Video, algorithms, and 
security. How digital video platforms produce post-sovereign security articulations’, Security Dialogue, 48/4 
(2017), 354–72. 
stories of these leftovers can speak to us about the kind of desires, agents and logics that 
populate the field, in a way similar to how Despret’s fabulous animal stories speak of 
posthuman agencies and ethics6, and thus participate in re-composing military techno-
vision as an object.   
 I therefore ask in this paper how we can make sense of the sense-making yet hardly 
accessible activities taking place in the field of military techno-vision, and propose that 
the answer can lie in speaking to the objects through which we encounter military 
techno-vision. One way of doing so, I argue, is to assemble military techno-vision as an 
amalgamated and composite object of concern in which the parts encountered – despite 
the heterogeneity of its constituent practices, technologies, and discourses – have some 
common attributes and are, as I will show, asked to perform common epistemic 
operations. The objects encountered also, as I try to show here, subtly resist or at least 
create some friction between them and the discourses of those deploying them. Visual 
technologies not merely facilitate the goal of making ‘near real-time’7 sense of sociality 
from a distance, but in doing so they also perform occasionally lethal categorization, 
interpretation and decision in relation to the world they interact with, which is both why 
such technologies are of concern to me here and why friction is important between 
technology and the discourse it is deployed with. I examine how the detritus left by these 
technologies speaks of such resistance or friction, enabling a questioning of the work we 
ask these technologies to do. In so doing, I am arguing that there is value in not 
attempting to gain privileged access to shielded technologies, but instead re-composing 
military techno-vision from the heterogeneous detritus its development, use, and 
appropriation has left in the public space.  
I start here with setting out why it is important to access deliberately hardly accessible 
technologies in this way, thinking about how the performativity of different modes of 
inquiry may differ and introducing the three stories that I tell. Thereafter, I briefly 
introduce the how this method of composing an absent object relates to previous 
aesthetic inquiry in IR. In the following three sections, I tell the stories of leaked files 
produced by gun-camera sights, unanticipated semiotics revealed during machine vision 
development, and disused photographic film that ended up in the camera of an artist 
                                               
6 V. Despret, What would animals say if we asked the right questions?, (University of Minnesota Press, 2016). 
7 The quotidian military concept of ‘near real time’, I think, expresses well the practical discourse that 
privileges optical media in contemporary military practice. Its centrality to practical military thinking was 
highlighted to me in a recent interview with Danish Air Force personnel, see K. L. Jacobsen and R. 
Saugmann, ‘Optimizing Coalition Air Warfare: The Emergence and Ethical Dilemmas of Red Card Holder 
Teams’, Global Policy, (2019). 
portraying eastern Congo, before concluding with thinking about how the stories told 
encounter similar themes around the epistemic politics of leveraging visual technologies 
for purposes of security and warfare.  
Detritus, black boxes, and non-mimetic composition 
In contrast to the super-human clarity allegedly provided by militarized techno-vision, 
the systems underpinning different practices of more-than-human vision are most often 
kept opaque and inaccessible for the publics who are asked to believe in but not allowed 
to peer through advanced scopes, or to scrutinize the lines of code through which visual 
technologies of surveillance and lethality enact, compose and engage the world.  
When seeking to make sense of or with technology, and likewise of military use of 
technology, questions of secrecy, competence, and access are likely to appear as official 
and commercially motivated secrecy as well technical opacity limits makes scrutiny 
difficult. Military technologies are, however, far from the only area of social life in which 
such conditions are prevalent. Rather, as Frank Pasquale finds, such conditions are 
indicative of what he terms ‘the black box society’, an increasingly prevalent mode of 
governing that it is not driven by technological sophistication per se but in which 
considerations about the appropriate mix of secrecy and transparency are giving 
increasing priority to secrecy. Strategies combining ‘real secrecy’ -  like locked doors and 
passwords – with ‘legal secrecy’ obligations to not share knowledge, and ‘obfuscation’ 
about the workings of advanced technologies are adept at creating black boxes of 
decision-making closed off from citizen scrutiny8, and security rationales provide what 
Pasquale terms a ‘formidable legal armamentarium’9 for these. While in institutional 
setups such as patent law, secrecy was balanced with transparency towards a trusted 
agency, today’s technologies are kept far more opaque, and the ‘move from legitimation-
via-transparency to protection-via-secrecy was the soil of which the black box society 
sprang’10.  
The unearthing of black-boxing as a performative governance logic rather than an 
unfortunate circumstance arising from complexity as well as military and commercial 
competition pressures is inspirational in that it invites both re-considering the idea of a 
black box, its performativity, and the response to it. Black-boxing logics at work around 
                                               
8 F. Pasquale, The black box society: the secret algorithms that control money and information, (Harvard University 
Press, 2015), 6. 
9 Pasquale, The black box society, 193. 
10 Pasquale, The black box society, 193. 
military techno-vision creates conditions in which the promotional narratives of actors 
engaged in the area encounter fertile ground for creating public perception of the area. 
Yet even if obfuscation and secrecy abound, both specific visual technologies and the 
military application of them do exist in relation to publics, and will rarely be completely 
shielded from these. Rather than seek privileged access and engage in the ‘implicit 
bargaining’ that come with such efforts11, what I set out to do in this paper is to engage 
in composing military techno-vision as an object of concern via the detritus left in the 
public space by different practices such as development, military use, and scrutiny or 
appropriation of objects that can be assembled as parts of a composite object of concern. 
Composing, to Latour’s manifesto that informs this special issue, is ‘not too far from 
“compromise” and “compromising”’12, and indeed what I try in this is composition both 
to compromise by juxtaposing different heterogeneous left-overs without glossing over 
their heterogeneity and to be compromising by using the public detritus from a field of 
action to speak about the instabilities and fragility that is glossed over by black-boxing, 
secrecy, and obfuscation. 
 It is paramount here that this composition is not mimetic in the sense that I hold such 
an object to exist, fully fledged and ready for critical interrogation in a reality external to 
this treatment – i.e. possess the elements of anteriority, independence and definiteness 
that Law13 treats as questionable parts of ‘out-thereness’. Rather, military techno-vision is 
‘built from utterly heterogeneous parts that will never make a whole, but at best a fragile, 
revisable, and diverse composite.’14 It is my concern with engineering vision and applying 
the results of such engineering to security and conflict that drives me to assemble and 
label military techno-vision from the detritus left in the public sphere by such engineering 
and use. Like all composites it may crack or dissolve when exposed to heat or stress, or it 
may fail to amalgamate and remain separate heterogeneous parts.  
Three fables about military techno-vision 
Ideas and stories that may help identifying what military techno-vision might be can be 
sourced from the different encounters between visual technologies, militarisation of 
                                               
11 T. A. Undheim, ‘Getting Connected: How Sociologists Can Access The High Tech Elite’, The Qualitative 
Report, 8/1, 104–28, 122; for the military field see also E. Ben-Ari and Y. Levy, ‘Getting access to the field: 
Insider/outsider perspectives’, Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies, (Milton 
Park: Routledge, 2014), pp. 9–19. 
12 B. Latour, ‘An Attempt at a “Compositionist Manifesto”’, New Literary History, 41 (2010), 471–90, 474. 
13 After Method Mess in social science research, (Routledge, 2004), 24. 
14 Latour, ‘An Attempt at a “Compositionist Manifesto”’, 474. 
these, and the public spheres they interact with. From the inception of a technology 
which usually takes place in least partly civilian engineering lab, through its classified use 
by the professionals of security, to its possible afterlife as a once-again civilian 
technology, black-boxing will never be complete and bits of pieces of detritus will be left 
in the public space. I choose here to pick up detritus that originate from the civilian 
development of technologies that are simultaneously undergoing militarisation, from the 
application of visual technologies in warfare, and from the civilian repurposing of once-
militarised visual technologies. Inspired by Despret’s fables that permit ‘understanding 
how difficult it is to figure out what animals are up to’15 without reducing their diversity, 
I relate the stories enabled by these pieces of technology-related detritus, asking what it is 
these technologies are up to, and – adding considerations that relate to black-boxed 
technologies rather than to animals, and to the ever-pertinent question of how humans 
and technologies reconfigure the agency of each other16 – what they think of how we 
think about them and interact with them. In contrast to Despret’s diverse fables that do 
not aim to characterise animals but rather to argue in favour of not reducing them, I 
compose an object of concern out of the stories I tell, inevitably performing a somewhat 
reductionist move but doing so to be able to speak of how we interact with these 
different technologies in similar ways. I thus inquire into how human and technological 
agency is reconfigured around the object of military techno-vision, in technological 
practice as well as in the discourses surrounding technologies, thinking the composite of 
military techno-vision without glossing over or reducing the heterogeneity of the 
phenomena within it.  With this I intend to enable a conversation about the operations 
performed with military techno-vision, and how black boxes, discourses, and technical 
practices relate to this.  
The detritus I pick up for this effort is pieces of published or leaked footage, scientific 
controversies, and an artistic engagement with a declassified technology of militarised 
vision.  
First, I tell of two relatively common access points through which we may be able to 
peer though military techno-vision. I consider the leaked battlefield video published by 
WikiLeaks with the title ‘collateral murder’, and relate it to a promotional video of 
                                               
15 B. Latour, ‘Foreword: The Scientific Fables of an Empirical La Fontaine’, in B. Buchanan (tran.), What 
would animals say if we asked the right questions?, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), pp. 
vii–xv, vii. 
16 L. A. Suchman, Human-machine reconfigurations: plans and situated actions, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
precision strikes, published by the Israeli Defence Forces, an actor that pioneered this 
now widespread practice.  
Second, I pick up pieces from public engineering debates over a technology that is 
currently at the forefront of military efforts to leverage new visual technologies, the 
machine vision technology that is able to autonomously perform object recognition and 
pattern tasks. Similar technologies are being put to use by the US Dept. of Defense to 
perform drone image analysis, and inquiring into debates over testing image databases 
and reliable misrecognition tells both about the actual workings these complex systems, 
and about the parts we play in their operation.  
Third, I turn to the artist Richard Mosse’s photographic project ‘Come Out (1966), in 
which he uses a disused military film, designed to reveal what is invisible to the 
unassisted eye, to portray the conflict in eastern Congo, a conflict that is for western 
spectators particularly hard to immediately visually classify in terms of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
actors, highlighting the work done by such classification.  
Military vision technologies and regimes of visibility 
Seeing, even if grounded in the biological affordances of our species, is a thoroughly 
social process. It is full of expectations, desires, taboos, learned associations and rules.17 
The grids of intelligibility formed by these rules have been theorized under many 
different names that cover what I see to be roughly similar ideas. They are variously 
called ‘scopic regimes’,18 ways of seeing,19 aesthetic regimes,20 or regimes of visuality 
(and vision)21 or, in an IR context ,‘regimes of perceptibility’,22  epistemic regimes,23 or 
scopic regimes.24 Common for these ideas is that they describe how images enact 
divisions of the sensible,25 forming regimes that tell us how to make sense of visual 
information and what to consider meaningful.   
Pictures and the technologies and devices producing them are inevitably agents of such 
                                               
17 M. Jay, ‘Scopic regimes of modernity’, in H. Foster (ed.), Vision and visuality, (Seattle: Bay Press, 1988). 
18 Martin Jay, ‘Scopic regimes of modernity’, drawing on Christian Metz. 
19 J. Berger, Ways of Seeing, (British Broadcasting Association and Penguin, 1972). 
20 J. Rancière, The politics of aesthetics: the distribution of the sensible, kii ed. (Continuum, 2004), 8. 
21 H. Foster, Vision and visuality, (Bay Press, 1988). 
22 R. van Munster and C. Sylvest, ‘Documenting International Relations: Documentary Film and the 
Creative Arrangement of Perceptibility’, International Studies Perspectives, 16/3 (2015), 229–245. 
23 R. S. Andersen, ‘Remediating Security. A semiotic framework for analyzing how video speaks security’, 
University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Science 2015, 187ff. 
24 K. Grayson and J. Mawdsley, ‘Scopic regimes and the visual turn in International Relations: Seeing world 
politics through the drone’, European Journal of International Relations, (2018), 135406611878195. 
25 Rancière, The politics of aesthetics. 
regimes, which are not only constituted around vision but around post-human 
reconfigurations of biology, technology and culture. Film and photography is deployed 
by militaries and security agencies to know society in superior ways, isolating and 
dissecting societal behavioural patterns and making visible neglected details, providing 
some form of advantage over an enemy or, increasingly, revealing what is held to be 
possible or precursory forms of enmity where none are obvious. 
At the most basic level what any image does is that it highlights the transformation 
effected by the photographic image – the turning of a lived experience into an object26 
that can be looked at and stored but also circulated, mass reproduced, tampered with, or 
destroyed. This objectification is often held to come into its own in western visual 
culture through the seventeenth-century Dutch painters such as Vermeer,27 drawing on 
renaissance traditions of perspectivalism but exceeding and fracturing these to render 
narratives – which was the focus of previous visual and often religious art – opaque, 
while highlighting objects and their realistic representation.28 This western pictorial 
tradition, coming from the oil painting as it is developed in Dutch art building upon 
some of the inventions of the renaissance such as the Albertian and Brunelleschi’an 
formats of perspective, ‘defines the real as that which you can put your hands on’.29  
Recognizing that contemporary militarized seeing is dependent on rendering sociality 
recordable or storable in image objects that can be traced, mapped, stored, and analysed 
is thus not only recognizing a technological reality, it is also inescapably recognizing a 
cultural project. Shapiro points to this, without problematizing the object quality of 
images, when he notes that ‘the sense derived from seen objects is not merely a function 
of the degree of optical resolution; it derives from the projects and culturally induced 
expectations of the observer’.30 This ‘sense derived’ refers precisely to the semiotic 
process of interpretation that images are subjected to and engage in.  
Yet images are not simply objects that store reality unaffected, until we the viewers bring 
our cultural expectations to them. Engaging technological forms of vision developed in 
the last decades of the 20th century, and taking the engagement with technology as a 
departure for thinking about the agency of all forms of seeing, Haraway concludes that 
‘the “eyes” made available in modern technological sciences shatter any idea of passive 
                                               
26 cf. Berger, Ways of Seeing, 47. 
27 Jay, ‘Scopic regimes of modernity’, 12. 
28 Rancière, The politics of aesthetics, 24. 
29 Berger, Ways of Seeing, 88. 
30 M. J. Shapiro, Cinematic geopolitics, (Routledge, 2009), 66. 
vision; these prosthetic devices show us that all eyes, including our own organic ones, are 
active perceptual systems, building in translations and specific ways of seeing’.31 These 
two engagements, Haraway’s and Shapiro’s, go in opposite directions in the process of 
seeing, yet with similar aims. While Haraway sets off on a techno-scientific project 
pointing to the transformative agency of recording, Shapiro proceeds in a sociological 
direction and does the same with respect to the interpretative act of viewing. What opens 
the, for me, most interesting perspective here is the fusion of those two directions not in 
people that see and interpret but in technological systems that not only record, store, and 
transmit images for people to interpret, but makes image interpretation an automated or 
autonomous technological process too, fusing Shapiro’s ‘observer’, bearer of culturally 
induced expectations, with Haraway’s active perceptual prosthetic devices. Thinking with 
scopic regimes as part of composing military techno-vision thus emphasises the 
definition of the real enacted through the active translation of seeing into objects and 
through the grids of intelligibility that govern sense-making.  
 
Air-war footage and the fogs of war 
In contemporary warfare, video feeds often sustain western military operations in the 
distant battlefields of the ‘everywhere’ war, contributing to keeping western casualties 
low while projecting violence in low average intensity across vast areas of the world. 
Video technologies permit the overlay of biological vision with heat-sensoring, 
camouflage-detecting, night-vision and other technologies of imagination that facilitate 
military advantage, and permit ‘near real time’ command and control over violence from 
afar. As most of these technologies automatically stores the resulting images, they also 
create a visual archive of the violence they deploy. But despite countless hours of video 
of ’close air’, ‘dynamic’ combat or pre-planned targeting, relatively little makes its way to 
the eyes of the western publics in the name of whose security the conflicts take place. 
Most videos seem to be amateur milblog compilations remediating de-humanized ‘target’ 
strikes, de-contextualized to the point of being virtually meaningless.32 Some air-war 
footage is published online through mainstream news sources, e.g. the Associated Press’s 
‘Raw video’ series, giving an intelligible but promotional rendering of the battlefield 
                                               
31 Simians, Cyborgs, and Women. The Reinvention of Nature, (Free Association Books, 1991), 190. 
32 Any online video search involving the keywords ’strike’ and ’insurgents’ will demonstrate this. 
operations they portray,33 as these videos are presumably published with official consent.  
In this context, the US gun-camera video leaked from Iraq by Chelsea Manning and 
published by WikiLeaks as Collateral Murder functions as a meta-image,34 as it becomes a 
rare piece of public detritus that stands in for a vast genre hidden from public scrutiny.  
 
On April 5th, 2010, the whistle-blower organization WikiLeaks released a video showing 
some 40 minutes of classified gun-camera footage leaked to it from the battlefield in 
Iraq, publishing it under the loaded title Collateral Murder. According to the organization – 
and soon confirmed by US military sources – the video showed a July 12, 2007 series of 
air strikes taking place in Baghdad, in which two Reuters employees and ‘over a dozen’35 
unidentified Iraqi were killed. Alongside the 40 min. ‘raw’ version (containing the original 
decrypted video with only subtitles added) an edited 18 minute version with subtitles, 
explanatory text superimposed onto the images and a 2:25 minute introduction to the 
situation was released. All releases were made on a tailor-made website, 
collateralmurder.org. The website featured both versions of the video, both embedded 
from YouTube; captioned stills; a written summary overview of the video as well as the 
also leaked US Rules of Engagement from around 2007; biographical material and family 
testimonies relating to the two Reuters employees reportedly victims of the shooting 
seen in the video, and a lot of other background material.  
These (image)texts and contexts were immediately seized on by news media, political 
professionals, commentators, bloggers and remediated in various formats from TV 
broadcasts to tweets. By the time of writing the two versions of the video have been 
watched more than 19 million times online, with the short, edited and commented 
version accounting for the vast majority of those views, more than 16 million, and the 
longer accounting for 2,8 million views.36  
The video appears as a piece of scrap evidence, apparently recorded by the gun camera 
of the helicopter gunship involved in the incident, it gives access to a hitherto obscure 
                                               
33 While this is the general trend, both de-classified and leaked military video can be found online. see e.g. 
‘rtrThanos’, A-10 CAS, (2012) [unclassified]; and The Sun and ‘latestfacts’, Friendly Fire Cockpit Video Iraq 
2003. Matty Hull Killed, (2007) [leaked].. 
34 W. J. T. Mitchell, Picture Theory. Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation, (University of Chicago Press, 
1994). 
35 This figure is from the presentation at collateralmurder.com, accessed Sep 14th, 2012.  
36 YouTube viewcounts as of August 3rd, 2018: Long version 2,844,019; short version 16,307,482. Of 
course there is also innumerable clips, identical versions posted at different channels, shorter versions, 
commented versions and analyses etc. These are not included in this count, which is thus very conservative 
in terms of assessing the online spectatorship of the leaked video. The TV show The Young Turks’ 
analysis, for example, has been viewed more than 1.3 million times. 
reality – claiming that this is how it was37 in the obscured battlefield of Baghdad. Crucially, 
it also claims an aesthetic immediacy,38 that this is how it was seen - seen by the US military 
apparatus involved. This indexical-iconic reading of the visual signifiers as causally 
connected to and resembling the signified39 is thus reinforced by the military techno-
scientific discourses – on surgical strikes, revolutions in military affairs and the like – that 
claim (surgical) accuracy and super-human (enhanced) vision. WikiLeaks’ release aimed 
to turn the results of this discursive work40 (performed to legitimize militarized 
technology) from instruments of military propaganda to vehicles of critique, yet as I will 
show in the following, the video did not succeed in questioning the militarized vision as 
such, as rather than allowed to speak it was deflected by US authorities and weakened by 
the actions taken by WikiLeaks to promote and direct our viewing of the video.  
 
Occluding evidence: the performance of a semiotic fog of war by US authorities 
As the video spread, US defence authorities were called upon to explain how such a 
seemingly incriminating video could exist, documenting a well-known encounter that had 
been the object of public controversy (as two Reuters staff were killed) and of which no 
documentation was said to be available following Reuters’ inquiries.  The US authorities 
countered the video with two interrelated arguments, one about the partiality of the view 
offered and another deploying the metaphor of ‘the fog of war’ to argue that seeing the 
evidence contained in the video did not equate seeing what happened in the lethal 
encounter. The ‘lack of context’-argument holds that when watching the 40 minutes of 
video tape containing the view from one gun-camera as well as the crew radio, one 
should not confuse vision and knowledge: “You are looking at the war through a soda 
straw and you have no context or perspective”41 this argument holds. “One cannot judge 
it from the video alone” asserts an analyst42 echoing the comments by US Secretary of 
Defence that ‘there’s no before and there’s no after […] These people can put out 
                                               
37 R. Barthes, ‘Rhetoric of the Image’, Image Music Text, (London: Fontana Press, 1977), pp. 32–52, 44. 
38 J. Bolter and R. A. Grusin, Remediation: understanding new media, (MIT Press, 2000), 21. 
39 C. S. Peirce, Peirce on signs: writings on semiotic, (University of North Carolina Press, 1991). 
40 T. Gillespie, ‘The Relevance of Algorithms’, in T. Gillespie, P. J. Boczkowski, K. A. Foot (eds.), Media 
technologies: essays on communication, materiality, and society, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press, 2014), pp. 167–93, 188. 
41 US Defence Secretary Gates cited in S. Allan and K. Andén-Papadopoulos, ‘“Come on, let us shoot!”: 
WikiLeaks and the Cultures of Militarization’, Topia: Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies, 2010/23–24 (2010), 
244–253, 250. 
42 From a Danish defence think tank in Danish daily Politiken ‘Krigsvideo fører til krav om undersøgelse’, 
(2010) For an almost identical statement from a US Heritage Foundation analyst, see ; Politiken, ‘Anklager: 
USA nedskød civile i Irak’, (2010). 
anything they want’.43 This argument attacks the epistemic strength of the leaked video 
as a source of knowledge, challenging its position as a ‘witness’ able to give evidence. 
Second, the ‘fog of war’ metaphor extends the lack of vision argument from the video to 
the general situation, with the US Secretary of Defence asserting that “you talked about 
the fog of war. These people were operating in split-second situations.” 44 The narrative 
locates responsibility for any mistakes with the pressure of combat and laments that the 
reality of war is difficult, dismissing the technological devices providing enhanced vision. 
This renders the video hardly intelligible, but rather than attacking its epistemic authority 
as a documentation of war, it seems to extend this attack to the devices deployed in war, 
rendering the visual technologies of lethality unfortunately inadequate for penetrating the 
mythical fog of war. Choosing to not take responsibility for the careless deployment of 
lethal techno-vision at or beyond the very limits of its intelligibility – where all that can 
be seen and all that matters is bodies that, simply by being and living in the midst of what 
the US considered a battlefield, are rendered expendable and ungrievable – Gates 
deploys the fog of war narrative to imply that US forces do not see what they shoot very 
well, and use it as a defence against accusations of carelessness. “It’s painful to see, 
especially when you learn after the fact what was going on”45, implying that the 
technological vision deployed is not adequate for knowing what is going on. Two 
observations are interesting. First, the pilots indicated in sworn statements taken by the 
army investigation that ‘[v]isibility was good. Once we started the engagements of course, 
it kicked up dust so you know, it’s harder to see’46 so the deployment of the fog of war 
seems not come from the situation.  Second, no individual was faulted in any of the 
official investigations.47 Yet in enacting Collateral Murder as real, acknowledging its 
aesthetic immediacy, but reconfiguring the technology involved as unable to provide 
reliable knowledge, Gates enacts it as a kind of realism described by Rancière as 
stemming from modern literature’s ‘fragmented or proximate mode of focalization, 
which imposes raw presence to the detriment of the rational sequences of the story’.48 
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Here, the limits of hypermediated49 technologically enhanced visibility are magnified and 
enacted as a condition (the fog of war) rather than a choice based on policy (a practical 
weighing of how well soldiers need to see what they target according to rules of 
engagement; official responses to previous possibly unlawful killings; etc.). Gates thus 
sustains that the ground truth is both unknowable from the de-contextualized video 
evidence and that in context the video technologies employed were not able to penetrate 
the fog of war.  
This chain of arguments can be understood as playing with two aesthetic concepts of 
scholarship on mediation. First, Gates mobilizes hypermediacy – the ‘windowed’ 
aesthetic of media-within-media50 – to make the lack of context argument that renders 
Collateral Murder unimportant and unreliable. Gates’ acknowledgement of the 
immediacy of the evidence is supplemented by his denunciation of it and his rendering of 
our seeing as hypermediated – as a leisurely form of spectatorship that is different from 
the immediacy of the battlefield. Hasian finds this idea twisted to one of professionalised 
vision in the ‘many milblog commentaries that underscored the point that only those 
who had guarded democratic nations and survived the crucible of war had the ability or 
right to authoritatively comment on the ‘‘context’’ for interpreting the Apache video 
feeds.51 This defence enacts a militarized critique of civilian spectatorship as unrealiable 
qua hypermediated and civilian, the hypermediation serving to deprive the very images 
used by soldiers in targeting of their power to know the battlefield.  
Along similar lines, Mortensen52 takes the instability of meaning derived from the video 
(the mistaking of a camera for an RPG, for example) questions the very notion of ‘visual 
evidence’. She contends that ‘the reliability and readability of the gun camera tape are 
questioned’ by the mistakes made in the video. Yet in their attempts to weaken the 
epistemic status of the video, US military authorities attack the lack of context and the 
‘fog’ occluded by this soda-straw view, rather than the footage itself. The video is taken 
to mean different things by different actors and in different remediations, but its lack of 
reliability as witnessing is not due to its quality, but rather due to lack of context or 
military training, suggesting that military techno-vision is a particular human-machine 
configuration that cannot be replicated in public. While acknowledging that the video 
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gave the crew the intelligence it needed for acting, the US military establishment seeks to 
herd the image back into the fold of impermeable ambiguity and contain the epistemic 
authority to produce security knowledge from the video sequences within the spheres of 
the ‘professionals of security and politics’.53 But the authorities responsible for the 
violence shown in the video are not the only ones to seek to influence the video and 
direct who can interpret it and how. This ambition is shared by the publisher of the 
leaked video, WikiLeaks. 
In their seeking to control the interpretation and spread of the video, WikiLeaks deploy 
different semiotic techniques, namely anchoring and editing.54 Drawing on dominant 
representational codes of mediating remote warfare, they overlay the video with 
explanatory textual anchors and use editing to create a spectacular short version of the 
video in which a clear narrative – of careless US military staff – stands out. In doing so, 
WikiLeaks manipulates the video to fit what Chouliaraki terms ‘”ecstatic news” - news so 
extraordinary that it warrants live coverage beyond the normal news bulletin, bringing 
global audiences together around a 24/7 mode of reporting’55 – furthering the 
remediation of the video. But this spectacular editing also keeps the video firmly within 
the traditional set of representational codes, seeking to utilize these for partly differing 
purposes: while one common purpose is to control interpretation and maximize spread 
of a video, Wikileaks seek to criticize rather than celebrate or motivate the depicted acts 
of war. In its desire to produce effortless ecstatic news - or ‘corroborative’ spectacles 
rather than ‘pensive’ video that would cause the spectator to ‘see’ and think, but also 
provide room for interpretation56  – WikiLeaks is compromising its critical ability, 
denying the video the room to speak for itself. This entails a denial of visual ambiguity in 
favour of an easily recognizable visual narrative with good and bad actors.57 
The anchoring techniques employed by Wikileaks are shared with the promotional 
videos published by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), an actor at the forefront of using 
video in propaganda efforts. These come in many formats, but a particular type or genre 
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is videos ‘revealing’ Hamas’ deceptive military installations in civilian areas and showing 
the destruction of these installations by precision strikes. The typical example has footage 
from a drone or other air surveillance, overlaid with text anchors exactly like the ones 
used by Wikileaks but labelling this or that building as a ‘Hamas rocket factory’ or 
‘launch site’, seconds before the facility is destroyed by a missile. 58  
 
Figure 1: Screenshots from IDF video59 (left) and from the WikiLeaks-edited version of Collateral 
Murder60 (right) 
 
Using text anchors imposes sense onto the images and force distinctions onto the 
indistinguishable persons and buildings seen, in the case of IDF rendering them less-
than-civilian and thus un-grievable.61 To Gordon and Perugini, such terms applied to 
persons in a battlespace ‘actively participated in structuring acts of war’,62 functioning as 
speech acts that have devastating legal and practical consequences. In their analysis of the 
deployment of the term human shield they note how, ‘[a]s a perlocutionary speech act, 
the term “human shields” bestowed a legal definition upon thousands of Iraqi civilians–
before the assault on Mosul even began—that preemptively relaxed the conditions under 
which Iraqi forces and their allies could deploy violence.’63 The efficiency of disciplining 
images via overlaid ‘explanatory’ text here lies in its giving purpose to what appears as 
un-motivated bombing of everyday infrastructure such as houses and cars by rendering 
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these as targets, that they are e.g ‘bomb-storage sites disguised as greenhouses’.64 
 
This section has used air-war video detritus – either leaked or published as part of public 
diplomacy efforts – to present the first fable of military techno-vision. The stories tell of 
how regimes of visibility are not only the result of secrecy around military techno-vision 
but also conditioned by complex human-technology reconfigurations such as those 
enacted in news media remediation criteria favouring visual representations that are both 
ecstatic and un-ambiguous.  
The remediation regime can be thought of a semiotic fog that abounds in the politico-
epistemic landscape of video-mediated security and influences how military techno-
vision is perceptible to the public. When you shed light on fog, you do not necessarily 
see the landscape any clearer. Rather, the light is likely to alert you to how you are 
immersed in fog and cannot see very far; and my aim here is not to dissipate this fog but 
to tell of how it is composed and how it is rendered penetrable only by the professional 
vision of operators of technologically mediated seeing involving laser-guided missiles, 
heat-sensing and night vision scopes, obscuring to the public the human vision of 
atrocities performed in plain view. 
Through the practices of promotional publication of footage and news media 
remediation, we become accustomed to ‘our’ warring being visualized as precision 
bombing footage with anchoring labels – or, alternatively, rendered a distant spectacle of 
shock and awe. This makes it possible to assert that the view offered in leaked video is 
occluded by fog or by lack of information or professional viewing practices, rather than a 
modus operandi of air war where technologically enhanced vision zooms in but is not 
able to do away with ambiguity. The normal ways of visualizing war – where ambiguity is 
done away with through textual anchors and editing, and which WikiLeaks seeks to 
conform to in order to maximise remediation – thus operate as a semiotic fog, 
preventing us from making critical sense of what we see. Thus, ‘[w]hen we are able to 
note a marked failure of perception – cases of misrecognition of persons or objects – 
one can attribute it to the fogging effects of a productive consciousness rather than to a 
haze that exists in the world, intervening between understanding or vision and object’.65 
Rather than simply a haze, this productive regime of visibility is directional, steering 
interpretation of military footage towards reducing ambiguity and presenting techno-
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vision as full of actionable intelligence, and towards ecstatic representation that can 
sustain large media audiences. Thus, the problematique of military techno-vision and the 
public cannot be overcome by simply making images public. While the black-boxing of 
military techno-vision may in the first place enable discourses of surgical precision to co-
exist with large civilian losses, changing the regime of visibility is also a matter of 
changing the public structuration of vision. 
Machines, vision, and security 
After decades of development of ever-more powerful surveillance technology, the 
problem of visuality for security services is at the moment not sensing or optics, it is 
vision (or understanding). Terrorism attacks such as the 2012 Breivik leave authorities 
with tens of thousands of hours of relevant surveillance footage to review.66 Already in 
2011, ‘the US Air Force [had] amassed over 325,000 hours of drone video—that’s about 
37 years of video’ and today a ‘single drone with these sensors produces many terabytes 
of data every day. Before AI [artificial intelligence] was incorporated into analysis of this 
data, it took a team of analysts working 24 hours a day to exploit only a fraction of one 
drone’s sensor data’.67 These are not only data problems, as already in 2010 the fog of 
war – the metaphor that is used to occlude erroneous lethal decisions – had become 
digital in the sense that the US had taken to blame drone strikes targeting civilians on 
digital ‘information overload’.68 The contemporary problem is thus understanding, not 
information: ‘the defense intelligence community is currently drowning in data. Every 
day, US spy planes and satellites collect more raw data than the Defense Department 
could analyse even if its whole workforce spent their entire lives on it’.69 
Machine vision, the development of technology – often described as artificial intelligence 
and currently based on neural network computing architectures – to perform tasks like 
categorising content in images (e.g. colours, shapes, or metadata) and searching for 
patterns in or between multiple images or matching image contents with an existing 
database, is the current proposition for turning observation into the militarised version 
of understanding, actionable intelligence. Like the pieces of detritus from air warfare, 
there are also traces of machine vision in the public space, albeit not in the same way of 
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its direct military application. The traces of machine vision relate to software 
development controversies, from debates over the training and testing of software in 
image databases to debates over reliability and misrecognition. From there I work my 
way towards machine vision systems that are trained through them and the visual culture 
developed from databases and the algorithms working with them.  
 
Training databases, ambiguity and ground truth 
A surprisingly small number of large image databases have been used for training and 
testing most of the leading machine vision systems built so far. This is due both to the 
cost of crating databases, the advantages of re-using that labour, as well as of the 
possibility for measuring different systems’ performance against the same databases.  The 
most widely used training image database, ImageNet is built by having search engines 
look for images following simple descriptors in major search engines, i.e. it consists of 
images harvested online following to some degree the labels attached to them in search 
engines.70 Search engine images reflect the cultures supplying these images as well as the 
terms used to find them, making them culturally specific. The constructors of ImageNet 
are aware of this in remarking that ‘[t]o further enlarge and diversify the candidate pool, 
we translate the queries into other languages, including Chinese, Spanish, Dutch and 
Italian’,71 yet such enlargement also highlight the narrow language selection parameters. 
Images are described and categorized using the online labour-sourcing portal Mechanical 
Turk, where workers get paid in fractions of cents for each very small job they complete. 
After unknown workers produce and cross-verify each other’s descriptions, an image is 
entered into the database which in 2014 ‘contain[ed] 14,197,122 annotated images 
organized by the semantic hierarchy of WordNet’.72 The database contains more than 
twenty thousand categories of objects, meaning that this is the number of object 
categories that machine vision systems can then be trained to recognize. The ImageNet 
database hosts an annual machine vision competition in which systems compete in image 
classification - which ‘tests the ability of an algorithm to name the objects present in the 
image, without necessarily localizing them’; object detection and localization – which ‘evaluates 
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the ability of an algorithm to localize one instance of an object category; and object detection 
– which evaluates the ability of an algorithm to name and localize all instances of all 
target objects present in an image.73 The competition is based on images harvested from 
Flickr74 and has been credited with contributing to the recent acceleration in advances in 
deep learning following a breakthrough made in the 2012 contest.75  
 
The limitations of ImageNet are not only with regards to the finite number of categories 
and sources of image data. As a competing database built later, Microsoft Common 
Objects in Context (MS COCO), asserts, ‘current recognition systems perform fairly well 
on iconic views, but struggle to recognize objects otherwise – in the background, partially 
occluded, amid clutter – reflecting the composition of actual everyday scenes.’76 This is 
the result of ImageNet (and other datasets’) images being sourced primarily through 
search engine querying, producing ‘iconic’ images in which the sought-after object or 
attribute is paramount, leading to images that according to the MS COCO developers 
‘lack important contextual information and non-canonical viewpoints’.77 In such settings, 
‘Object category presence is often ambiguous. Indeed … even dedicated experts often 
disagree on object presence, e.g. due to inherent ambiguity in the image or disagreement 
about category definitions’.78 Yet, as machine teaching goes, the dataset still works by 
assigning a ‘ground truth’, ‘computed using majority vote of the experts’79 to denote 
what the image ‘truly’ contains. Ambiguity and polysemy, which have been at the heart of 
thinking about seeing since at least Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit80, is thus eradicated in 
favour of a unitary ground truth, already in the database construction process and thus 
carried over into the interpretative work done by machine vision software.  
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Several other features of these datasets are interesting. An illustrious ‘unsupervised’ 
discovery, in which Google’s machine vision system discovered a class of objects, 
highlights the political economy of objects. The discovery was made in ‘Google Brain in 
which a giant unsupervised learning system was asked to look for common patterns in 
thousands of unlabelled YouTube videos. One day one of Mr Ng’s PhD students had a 
surprise for him. “I remember him calling me over to his computer and saying, ‘look at 
this’,” Mr Ng recalls. On the screen was a furry face, a pattern distilled from thousands 
of examples. The system had discovered cats.’81  Anybody familiar with YouTube and 
the output of its recommendation algorithms82 will know that cats are at the apex of an 
YouTube’s video-industrial complex, making the discovery of cats also a feedback loop 
discovering the algorithmic governance of the visual public, rather than merely 
discovering furry animals.  
Given the importance of and difficulty with datasets for developing machine vision 
systems, these will likely also be an issue for surveillance and military applications of 
machine vision. Training datasets are thus, unsurprisingly, an issue in publicly known 
military applications of machine vision. The most well-known, Project Maven, a US 
Department of Defense project to establish an ‘Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Function 
Team’, was widely reported in 2018 due to the revelation that Google was involved 
despite promises to not weaponise artificial intelligence, and the subsequent protests by 
Google employees that made the company not renew its contract.  
The project’s objective is ‘to turn the enormous volume of data available to the DoD 
into actionable intelligence and insights at speed’, with the project’s first tasks already 
familiar from above, namely to ‘organize a data-labeling effort, and develop, acquire, 
and/or modify algorithms to accomplish key tasks’.83 Activists have warned that this 
efforts is an important one on the road to autonomous weapons, with its aims to ‘reduce 
the human factors burden [i.e. labour needs] of FMV [Full-Motion Video] analysis, 
increase actionable intelligence, and enhance military decision-making’.84 Project Maven 
thus ‘seeks to automate basic labeling and analysis associated with full-motion video 
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surveillance',85 something that as we shall see is far from unproblematic. It ‘focuses on 
analysis of full-motion video data from tactical aerial drone platforms such as the 
ScanEagle and medium-altitude platforms such as the MQ-1C Gray Eagle and the MQ-9 
Reaper.’,86 some of the drones responsible for the visual data deluge.  
Even if Maven focuses on one class of images only, the differences in the size of image 
training data are striking: ‘In Maven’s case, humans had to individually label more than 
150,000 images in order to establish the first training data sets; the group hopes to have 1 
million images in the training data set by the end of January [2018].87 Whether one or the 
other – noting that hopes and future promises in military technology are unlikely to 
describe anything close to reality – the paucity of training images is striking compared to 
the lethal applications the software is aimed at, especially given the way in which 
ImageNet’s 14 million images were described above as mainly giving ‘iconic’ views of the 
objects identified in them, and the trouble with misrecognition that we will interrogate 
below.  
The approach to deal with this paucity of labelled data seems to be one of limiting the 
capabilities of the system – or, if we adopt the anthropomorphic lingo of artificial 
intelligence and machine vison, one of visual stupidity. Thus, Maven’s 'immediate focus 
is 38 classes of objects that represent the kinds of things the department needs to detect, 
especially in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.'88 While it may be 
desirable to start out with a narrow focus, such a focus obviously doesn’t alter the 
ambiguity and multiplicity that is the ‘ground truth’ in which those bearing the hardships 
of e.g. Daesh/IS and the fight against them, it only sharpens the reductionism of the 
machinic notion of ‘ground truth’.  
 
Militarized machine vision will need training datasets that not only permits the systems 
learning from them to segment objects and distinguish between them but also be highly 
sensitive to context (think of a fighter with a gun versus a farmer with a gun), visual 
culture (e.g. similar gestures with different cultural meanings), as well as enemies trying to 
not be classified as such.  
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Machine misrecognition 
Seeking to get an idea of how machine vision works, and which controversies are 
debated within the community developing it, I eventually arrived at some of the most 
scrutinized systems, Google’s publicly available image description and object 
identification systems. These, I thought, would have to stand in for the secret but 
probably similar systems that I suspected would be at worked in military image databases, 
and this section was written on that background. Yet in the first months of 2018, it was 
revealed that Google was indeed providing machine vision services to the US 
Department of Defense, through Project Maven. The descriptions of this project as an 
effort that ‘will ‘provide computer vision algorithms for object detection, classification, 
and alerts for FMV [full-motion video] PED [processing, exploitation, and 
dissemination]’ 89 brought uncanny memories of the features I had laughed at in 
descriptions of the image description and object labelling system, which are described 
below.  
Google’s image description and object identification system works through combining 
different neural networks, as shown in figure 2, combining machine vision with natural 
language processing.  
 
 
Figure 2: Representation of Google’s image description and object identification system90 
 
The use value of this combination – identification and description – lies partly in its 
making images compatible with other database objects, and easily searchable through the 
keywords and object descriptors generated. This epistemic rendering of the image rests, 
firstly, on an understanding of images as transparent or non-distorting – what can be 
termed an aesthetic of immediacy91 in which iconic images, as described above, 
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maintains an indexical connection to the world they depict. Secondly, it rests on an 
understanding of reality as limited and un-ambiguous. These properties are striking if we 
turn not to the research paper outlining the system but rather to the description of it on 
the Google AI Blog: 
 
‘“Two pizzas sitting on top of a stove top oven” “A group of people shopping at an outdoor market” 
“Best seats in the house” People can summarize a complex scene in a few words without 
thinking twice. It’s much more difficult for computers. But we’ve just gotten a bit closer 
-- we’ve developed a machine-learning system that can automatically produce captions 
(like the three above) to accurately describe images the first time it sees them.’ 92 
 
The claims above are strikingly at odds with the understanding of images that one would 
get from the disciplines engaging images in the social sciences – visual studies, visual 
culture studies, visual semiotics or the like. The sentences presented as analogue to how 
humans effortlessly describe an image do not sound like how most people would 
describe any scene or image, yet the creators assure that the system meets state-of-the-art 
thresholds and comes close to ‘human performance’ even with the added difficulty of 
formulating image captions in sentences.93 The idea that humans effortlessly describe an 
image in identical or like terms can be seen as the discursive upkeep that is always part of 
algorithmic governance,94 in this case discursive work aiming at disciplining the images to 
fit with one of the fundamental ideas in machine vision learning, the previously 
mentioned idea of a ‘ground truth’ that can be assigned to an image so that the machine 
vison system can learn to match this correctly with different images.  
While the problematic idea of ground truth can also be interrogated through studying 
training database design, as above, what the debate about machine vision systems adds is 
not only whether or not images can be reduced to ground truths, but rather the what is 
the agency of the translation of images that occurs when they become objects of machine 
vision, and the technological fragility in this transformation. In an intriguing article titled 
‘Deep Neural Networks are Easily Fooled: High Confidence Predictions for 
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Unrecognizable Images’,95 the authors show that ‘it is easy to produce images that are 
completely unrecognizable to humans, but that state-of-the-art DNNs believe to be 
recognizable objects with 99.99% confidence’. Using machine vision systems trained on 
ImageNet or similar large databases, and pairing these with evolutionary algorithms ‘that 
optimize images to generate high-confidence DNN predictions for each class in the 
dataset the DNN is trained on’,96 the authors are able to supply machine vision 
algorithms with abstract or non-representational images and find images amongst these 
that are labelled by machine vision algorithms with very high levels of confidence. The 
technical process for doing so is not my concern here, rather I am interested in the 
character of the images, and the relations between the images, the discourse of machine 
vision, and the type of understanding sought or gained through machine vision.  
 
 
Figure 3: Fooling images and the labels they trigger. Illustration from Nguyen et al. 97 
 
The strangeness of these images that seem familiar to machine vision systems is 
intriguing, funny - and deeply uncanny given that Project Maven and probably similar but 
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classified military projects are already employing machine vision to classify and follow 
objects of concern in the battlefield.98 While the images in the lower panes betray some 
abstract symmetry and perhaps some flicker of likeness to that which they are mistaken 
as, preserving just a hint of the iconicity that pervades human visual meaning making, the 
images above show nothing that human understanding can relate to the categories they 
trigger in machine vision systems. Surprisingly, perpahs, the errors uncovered here seem 
to be rather robust, as ‘it is not easy to prevent the DNNs from being fooled by 
retraining them with fooling images labelled as such. While retrained DNNs learn to 
classify the negative examples as fooling images, a new batch of fooling images can be 
produced that fool these new networks, even after many retraining iterations.’99 
 
The detritus stemming from engineering controversies reveal the utopianism 
underpinning even modest military machine vision projects, such as project Maven’s 
effort towards autonomous labelling of 38 classes of objects, as these rely on much 
smaller training databases than their impressive but also fragile civilian counterparts. 
Despite the virtues of civilian systems – including superior databases and prestigious 
international competitions running for close to a decade to spur development – non-
military systems are prone to not only systematic misrecognition but to systematic 
miscecognition of fundamentally non-iconic images as objects. It seems, from the 
account of project Maven above, that machine vision systems may perform well enough 
in terms of ‘actionable intelligence’ when and if what is required of such intelligence is 
crude enough – e.g. simple tasks such as following or identifying a car in drone footage 
from an area without heavy traffic.  This militarised version of knowledge seems to 
bother less with reliability and more with producing possibilities for further ‘action’. Yet 
the interrogations of civilian systems with far larger and more sophisticated training 
databases available shows that the form of understanding or intelligence that machine 
vision systems arrive at is fundamentally unrelated to what we call ‘vision’ in normal 
human interaction, and grounds this in visual ambiguity being side-stepped in the very 
fundamental premise of machine vision systems – the construction of training images 
and labels that enable the system to establish connections. Put in another way, whatever 
machine matching of images with labels and object categories is, it is not vision. Rather it 
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is statistics, sidestepping the agency of the semiotic act in favour of ‘ground truth’. The 
introduction of engineering ideas such as ‘ground truth’ into the domain of always 
unstable, ambiguous, and culturally specific social conventions that we call vision or 
seeing. The problems of using anthropomorphic language to describe algorithmic 
decision-making has been flagged before. Decades ago, McDermott derided such terms 
as ‘wishful mnemonics’ and warned that they were misleading in suggesting that 
algorithmic problem solving was analogous to human intelligence. Suchman and Sharkey 
take up the concept and refer McDermott’s suggestion for de-anthropomorphising 
algorithmic technologies like machine vision - ‘that we use names such as “G0034” and 
then see if it is as easy to argue that the program implements “understanding”.100 While 
this question is amusing, it may turn the contemporary problem in militarised machine 
vison on its head. It may rather be that when algorithms are already delegated decision-
making powers, as they are when they are employed to track vehicles, predict crime,101 
mediate political discussion,102 or function in other areas,103 anthropomorphic language 
is employed as part of the ‘discursive work’ of algorithmic governance, deployed to 
legitimise the decision-making of such systems.104 It is striking that while terms like 
intelligence, vision, and recognition abound, anthropomorphic description of the 
functions of algorithmic systems – arresting citizens, making security decisions, or 
deciding on visa applications – remain rare.  
How, then does this match with Haraway’s idea that ‘all eyes, including our own organic 
ones, are active perceptual systems, building in translations and specific ways of 
seeing’?105 Should we avoid terms like seeing and vision when interrogating what the 
scatter peacocks misrecognized by algorithms can tell about technologies entering the 
battlefield? Perhaps the term sorting, prominent in surveillance studies, comes closer to 
something that we can understand as agency that carries a responsibility, yet not mistake 
for an act that is intrinsically part of being human (like intelligence, sensing, etc.). At least 
these controversies show how machine object recognition is not only an active 
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perceptual system but a fundamentally post-human one, developing non-mimetic logics 
from the training data labelled in a reductionist mimetic designation of visual ground 
truth aimed at reducing perception to binaries and doing away with the ambiguity that 
may not be a ‘mistake’ in perception but rather a constitutive part of it. Were we to ask 
machine vison technology what it does, it would probably agree that vision, with its 
subjectivity and creativity, is not an appropriate description. The sorting performed relies 
on very different registers as it can perform on images with no mimetic qualities – as 
remarked by Armstrong, machines are alone in being able to ‘[w]iew images of oysters, 
herring, lobster, bread and butter, beer, or wine without experiencing the stirring of 
appetite’.106  Vision and seeing were never innocent metaphors, rather as Law107 and 
others have long pointed out, it was one of the legitimizing metaphors to establish 
science as neutral and detached from that which it works on and transforms. It is for this 
reason that I believe that the area of phenomena I tell fables about here has to be, at the 
very least, labelled ‘techno-vision’ 
False-colour reversal film and ambiguous detection of deception in 
Mosse’s Come Out (1966) 
My third entry point into militarized techno-vision is a piece of detritus that was picked 
up by an artist and then repurposed. A relatively steady stream of critical research has 
proceeded by using other engagements or controversies to interrogate security 
technologies and governance shrouded in secrecy, be these engagements scientific108, 
managerial109, artistic110, or public interest111 engagements. Similar avenues can be 
expected to help understand militarised techno-vision and to speak with the technologies 
used in this militarzation.  
Richard Mosse’s photo series from Congo, Come Out (1966), Infra and the video 
installation The Enclave presents an excellent entry point for using third party engagement 
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to think about militarised visual technologies. In the following, I use the images as 
devices to pry open military precision optics and lethal machine vision, looking at 
Mosse’s artistic images not so much to see what they show, but rather as what the visual 
culture theorist WJT Mitchell calls ‘picture theory’, images that ‘develop’ not a picture 
but a theory, much in the same way as a text does. When most powerful, a metapicture 
‘offers [...] an episteme, an entire system of knowledge/power relations’.112 I employ 
Mosse’s images to help such theorization and questioning of the episteme on which 
military techno-vison relies. It is not certain, nor necessary to my purposes, that this is 
what Mosse intends with his images. Used as ‘picture theory’, the images are not to be 
held responsible for the fables I use them to tell in subsequent research.  
The photos and videos in Come Out (1966), Infra and the Enclave use Kodak Aerochrome, 
a discontinued military reconnaissance film with an extra infrared exposure layer. The 
film’s infrared layer enables it to register chlorophyll in live vegetation, and was 
developed for aerial vegetation surveillance, and deployed to reveal camouflage. 
According to the producer it is ‘an infrared-sensitive, false-color reversal film intended 
for various aerial photographic applications where infrared discriminations may yield 
practical results’113, or in the terminology used here, provide actionable intelligence. The 
way in which the Aerochrome film produces these practical results is by colouring plants 
with living/active chlorophyll – an agent of photosynthesis – pink; while leaving the dead 
organic or non-organic material used in camouflaging efforts in its original colours. 
 
The film was developed as an enhanced way of military seeing, operative in camouflage 
detection. It was ‘developed by the US military in the 1940s to detect camouflage and to 
reveal part of the spectrum of light the human eye cannot see.’114 
As explained by the producer, ‘[c]olor infrared-sensitive films were originally designed 
for reconnaissance and camouflage detection. In fact, the term “CD” was once used to 
denote the camouflage detection role of this film. Color infrared films were sometimes 
effective when used to photograph objects painted to imitate foliage. Some paints may 
have infrared reflectance characteristics quite different than those of foliage. In the 
resulting color infrared transparency, the areas of healthy deciduous foliage will be 
magenta or red, and the painted objects may be purple or blue. (However, some paints 
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have now been developed with spectral curves closely approximating those of some 
foliage.) Camouflaged areas are most easily detected by comparing a transparency made 






Figure 4: Photograph from the series Come Out (1966) by Richard Mosse  
 
In Infra, Mosse uses Aerochrome to take pictures of scenes in Eastern Congo, in areas 
torn by a civil war that for western spectators offers no easy visual categorization 
between ‘good’ and ‘evil’, the only immediate visible distinctions being between armed 
and unarmed, uniformed and non-uniformed. This uncertainty serves to distance the 
western spectator from the political context of the violence and blurry our expectations 
of what we are to see, fostering a somewhat bewildered rather than confirmatory gaze.  
 In Infra, the erratic colouring provided by the Aerochrome film becomes dizzying rather 
than legible, a destabilizing effect of the pink ‘magic’ of showing the world unknown to 
us. Mosse has explained that this misfit was what stirred his interest in using the film in 
Congo, remarking that ‘it seemed inappropriate and made me feel slightly uncomfortable’ 
116 The film makes the images almost surreal, beautiful, perhaps, but also confusing while 
at the same time showing the militarized production of visual ‘facts’, the labelling of 
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green in terms of nature and deceptive nature. Mosse’s Aerochrome images are opaque 
and hard to read operationally, their distribution of real and unreal unreliable and 
confusing rather than readily providing the ‘actionable information’ touted by military 
visualization technology producers. It thus reveals a world of technologically enhanced 
vision that loyally does the work of distinction that it is constructed to, yet at the same 
time questions its own applicability. Soldiers are marked as living plant materials, civilian 
housing stands out marked as deceptive, landscapes full of suspicion meet us and there 
appears to be at least as many questions after the use of the film as there were before. 
Where the filmic technology promises to extend our bodily abilities of seeing to leave us 
with a clearer view of opaque battlefields and ‘detect enemy positions in the 
underbrush’,117 Mosse exposes the visual fragility of such a technology that is extremely 
fragile both in representative and practical ways– it must be kept cold until exposure, and 
only very few studios can develop it. Observers have called attention to the way in which 
the resulting photography plays with tropes of Congo and Africa as the ‘dark 
continent’118, and truly it does. But it is also able to ‘make us call into question pictures 
we thought we understood.’119 and, I think, asks us to question their apparatus of 
production, the militarized technologies we are being asked to believe in but which we 
are not given access to scrutinize. The lethal ways of seeing enacted in militarized visual 
sensing systems depend on our trust in the visual technologies as ways of knowing the 
social or natural world without too much ambiguity. Such trust, then, forms the basis for 
the enactment of a ‘sovereign gaze’ that can support security decisions.120 With Mosse, 
we can scrutinize a warzone as the militarized visual technologies of the past would do, 
and appreciate that not only is technological vision transformative, it is collaborative: it 
contains an inescapable and hidden layer of uncertainty, confusion and mess that is being 
erased in the conversion of seeing – an always subjective, deeply personal and unstable 
biological-cultural faculty121– into a militarized form of knowing. This conversion is 
something that the technology cannot do, but where its black-boxed agency enables its 
operators to step in and gloss over ambiguity with technological certainty.  
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The enactment of a division between the real and the unreal can, I argue, be made visible 
in the way in which we can leverage Mosse’s use of the Aerochrome film to ask 
questions about the Aerochrome technology and militarized optical technologies more 
broadly. As citizens in whose name technologies such as Aerochrome are deployed but 
who are not allowed to be spectators to their deployment, we are told that this is a 
technological way of seeing the difference between nature and faked nature, revealing 
deception. But in the warzone of Congo, where kids are represented as playing next to 
corpses, what we see is not a fresh perception of a world made actionable in terms of real 
and fake by militarized optic technology, but a hardly intelligible, beautiful mess 
stemming from the technology rather than alleviated by it. Mosse, in a short interview 
film, states this as his ambition at least to a degree: The beauty of the images of the 
Congo conflict, he explains, ‘creates an ethical problem in the viewer’s mind so then 
they’re like confused and angry and disorientated and this is great because you’ve got 
them to actually think about the act of perception and how this imagery is produced and 
consumed’.122 While this may be the case for a photographer, the beautiful mess can also 
be used to think about the chain of security knowledge/decisions such images enter into. 
This points to the agency of the technology (as making a beautiful mess) but also to how 
technology is not lethal vision in itself: it becomes painfully clear that what comes after 
the technological translation of the world is a highly productive enactment of the mess as 
security knowledge – actionable intelligence – stripped of the ambiguity that abounds 
after techno-visual intervention. In the human-machine reconfiguration enabled by this 
technology, we are not beyond the need for interpretation and decision making, rather 
we are in the middle of it. 
Ambiguity and actionable intelligence in militarised techno-vision.  
In this article, I have tried to compose the composite object of military techno-vison 
from public documents, doing so without reducing the ambiguity and heterogeneity of its 
constituent components, without aiming or claiming to exhaust what these constituent 
components may be, and without claiming that the story could not have been told 
otherwise or that the composition presented here is infallible. The need for such an 
eclectic composition from socio-technological fables, rather than a neat, coherent, and 
rigorous analytical framework, stems, to me at least, from the performative power of the 
black boxes in which military techno-vision is cloaked. Rather than just an unfortunate 
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side-effect of unavoidable security concerns, such black-boxing is itself a productive 
force which directs analysis to either engage in implicit bargaining over and gratitude for 
access, or to the use of available material that is often promotional. In the composition 
of military techno-vision, layers of secrecy and opacity works in tandem with 
promotional discourses of artificial intelligence, more-than-human vision and (surgical) 
precision, legal and political discourses of less-than-civilian subject positions such as 
military-aged-males or people ‘bringing their kids to the battlefield’123, and with regimes 
of visibility in commercial media and visual culture. This enables the composition and 
legitimisation of military techno-vision as technologically and ethically superior 
production of ‘easily detected’ facts yielding ‘practical results’, ‘ground truth’ in an 
unambiguous domain of statistical techno-vision, and enables detritus from the actual 
operations of militarised visual technologies to be dismissable as occluded by a ‘fog of 
war’. Picking up such detritus, telling its stories, and asking about the work the 
technology it stems from is doing for us, asked to do for us, and about the configurations 
of humans and machines around it, I have shown, enables a composition of military 
techno-vision as complex configurations of humans and technologies in which decisions 
and actionable intelligence is always shrouded in ambiguity, and where ethics cannot be 
delegated to or vested in technologies. The desire to obscure ambiguity and render 
technological vision as actionable intelligence is visible in the interpretative anchoring 
applied to PR-videos as well as leaked video, in the brushing off of inconvenient leaked 
images as requiring professional vision to be interpreted, in notions of ground truth, and 
in the visualisation of a surreal mess produced in the application of military techno-vision 
to the battlefield in Congo. In different ways, the heterogenous pieces of detritus 
examined here tells us that ambiguity remains constitutive of both images and 
perception, and is merely glossed over in terms such as actionable intelligence that are 
mobilised to sustain security decisions and to render these potentially lethal decisions 
rational and reduce the ethical gravity they carry. This ‘hygienic’124 performance of the 
elimination of ambiguity is at the core of an epistemic politics of military techno-vision, 
manifested in different ways in the heterogeneous components that make up the area.   
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